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ARGUMENT
L

THE STATE CONFUSES FAILURE TO CITE AUTHORITY IN
SUPPORT OF AN ARGUMENT WITH FAILURE TO RAISE THE
ARGUMENT,

The State claims Shafer has waived argument that Utah Code Ann. §§ 68-3-8.5
and 68-3-12 (West 2002) demonstrate delivery of a notice of claim.1 The State points to
the general rule that issues not raised in the trial court cannot be raised for the first time
on appeal. Although "the principle is correct... its application here is not." Rich v.
McGovern, 551 P.2d 1266, 1268 (Utah 1976). In order to preserve an issue for appeal,
ff

(l) the issue must be raised in a timely fashion; (2) the issue must be specifically raised;

and (3) a party must introduce supporting evidence or relevant legal authority." Brookside
Mobile Home Park Ltd v. Peebles, 2002 UT 48, % 14, 447 Utah Adv. Rep. 3.
Under the first and second factors, Appellant Shafer argued that receipt of certified
mail constituted delivery of the notice and the person receiving the certified mail had
authority to do so or else the mail would have been rejected (R. at 73). Under the third
factor, Shafer provided the court with supporting evidence in the form of return receipts
showing delivery of the notice of claim via certified mail. Accordingly, the issue of
whether delivery of notice of claim via certified mail satisfied the statutory requirements

In support of its position, the State cites two cases, neither of which provide an
analysis regarding whether an issue has been preserved for consideration on appeal. Connor v.
Union Pacific RR., 972 P.2d 414 (Utah 1998)(party wholly failed to raise issue in trial court) and
Ellis v. Swensen, 2000 UT 101, 16 P.3d 1233 (court found that issue was properly raised in trial
court and therefore could be considered on appeal).
1

was properly raised and preserved.
The State confuses the failure to raise an argument below with the failure to cite
authority in support of that argument. The law has long recognized that even though
statutory authority is not cited to the trial court, it may nonetheless be considered on
appeal.2 "[A] statute not addressed below but pertinent to the substantive issues which
were raised below may be considered for the first time on appeal." Bennett v. Hardy, 918,
784 P.2d 1258, 1260 (Wash. 1990). The simple failure by counsel for Shafer, counsel for
the State and the trial court itself to cite relevant statutory authority cannot provide a basis
on which to wholly ignore clear legislative enactments.
This Court already recognizes that "[a]n appellate court has inherent authority to
consider issues which the parties have not raised if doing so is necessary to a proper
decision." Kaiserman Associates, Inc. v. Francis Town, 977 P.2d 462, 464 (Utah 1998).
The doctrine that arguments cannot be raised for the first time on appeal "is not [] applied
in a vacuum. Where some countervailing principle is to be served, the doctrine must
occasionally yield." Cox Rock Products v. Walker Pipeline Const, 754 P.2d 672, 676
(Utah Ct. App. 1988). Indeed, judicial notice of Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-8.5?s
presumption that return receipt demonstrates delivery may be taken "where there is a

2

Walker v. Lloyd, 4 N.E.2d 306, 308 (Mass. 1936)("fact that certain pertinent
statutes of Vermont were not brought to the attention of the trial judge does not preclude this
courtfromconsidering decisions and statutes"); Wilson v. Martinez, 307 P.2d 605, 605
(Wyo.l957)(holding appellate court is "bound to notice" the "relevant law of this state.");
Peterson v. Paoli, 44 So.2d 639, 640 (Fla.l950)(Taking judicial notice of applicable statute "even
though such statute was overlooked in the proceedings in the court below." ).
2

compelling countervailing principle to be served." Finlayson v. Finlayson, 874 P.2d 843,
847 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) One such countervailing principle "exists when to do
otherwise would permit deviation from a legislative scheme." Mel Trimble Real Estate v.
Monte Vista Ranch Inc., 758 P.2d 451, 456 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). Failure to take notice
of Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-8.5 departs from the legislative scheme for delivering a notice
to the attorney general.
Courts also consider issues not raised below where that issue is the very right to
maintain the action. "We have recognized another exception to the general rule and have
considered issues not raised below when the question raised affects the right to maintain
the action." Bennett, 784 P.2d at 1260. Because the very question at issue is the right to
maintain an action against the state through compliance with the Governmental Immunity
Act's notice provisions, the Court ought to consider the statutes which govern whether a
notice was delivered.
Finally, consideration of the statutory law pertinent to delivering a notice of claim
is necessary to reach a proper decision in this case. "In our view, an overlooked or
abandoned argument should not compel an erroneous result. We should not be forced to
ignore the law just because the parties have not raised or pursued obvious arguments."
Kaiserman Associates, Inc. v. Francis Town, 977 P.2d 462, 464 (Utah 1998).
Importantly, because the Court's decision in this case will effect future construction of the
Acfs notice provision, a correct interpretation compels consideration of all available
statutory authority. Where "we are construing a legislative act that will be controlling not
3

only in this case but in future cases... [w]e cannot alter a correct construction simply
because both parties misconstrued the Act in the trial court." Adkins v. Uncle Barfs, Inc.,
2000 UT 14, Tf 40, 1 P.3d 528. A correct construction of the Governmental Immunity Act
notice provisions requires application of the legislative intent regarding delivery of
notices to the attorney general's office. Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-8.5fs presumption that
return receipt demonstrates delivery remains the law and cannot be ignored on appeal
because it bears directly on the issues now before the Court.
a

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL RECEIVED NOTICE AT A LISTED
OFFICE BY AN EMPLOYEE PERFORMING THE DUTIES OF
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL,

The State argues that this Court's decision in Greene v. Utah Transit Authority
"forecloses plaintiffs contention that receipt of notice by someone other than the attorney
general is consistent with the statute." (See, Appellee's Brief at p. 9). The State's
position is inconsistent with reality in that it pretends all notices must be received by the
individual currently occupying the office of attorney general. No matter which office the
notice is delivered to, it is idealistic to believe that Mark Shurtleff, Jan Graham or any
other Attorney General will step out of meetings, interrupt a telephone call, or even be
physically present to receive a Notice of Claim. Additionally, the State's position runs
contrary to other statutory directives which are more specific and, hence, controlling.
When we are faced with two statutes that purport to cover the same subject, we
seek to determine the legislature's intent as to which applies. In doing this, we
follow the general rules of statutory construction, which provide both that the best
evidence of legislative intent is the plain language of the statute and that a more
specific statute governs instead of a more general statute.
4

Jensen v. IHCHospitals, Inc., 944 P.2d 327, 332 (Utah 1997)(citations omitted). Here,
the Governmental Immunity Act's plain language does not require delivery to any one
particular office or person, nor does it specify where delivery may be accomplished and
how it is demonstrated. By contrast, Utah Code §§ 68-3-12 and 68-3-8.5 expressly sets
forth who is authorized to receive notice and how it may be delivered.
Receipt of a notice of claim by a person performing work on behalf of the attorney
general is the same as delivery to the attorney general him or herself. As admitted by the
State, Utah Code Ann § 68-3-12(2)(v) is "permissive." (See, Appellee's Brief at p. 9).
Accordingly, a person other than the Attorney General may receive a notice of claim
under the Governmental Immunity Act if performing those duties assigned to the
Attorney General. Holding otherwise will arguably drive claimaints to embark on a
course of formally serving the attorney general him or herself where ever they might be
found whether at church, social gatherings, or home with family. Allowing an employee
to receive notice is a common sense construction which recognizes that the Attorney
General cannot always be available to attend to such mundane and trivial administrative
tasks.
Return receipt for certified mail conclusively establishes delivery of the notice.
The State offers no substantive grounds to contradict Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-8.5?s
presumption that return receipt certified mail evidences delivery of the notice. The State
claims that Shaferfs reliance on the delivery of certified mail under Utah Code Ann. § 683-8.5 is 'misplaced' and 'proves too much.9 (See. Appellee's Brief at p. 11). The State
5

argues that, under Shafer's theory, a claimant could direct and deliver a document to the
president of a major university at a remote campus or the CEO of a national corporation
at a far flung manufacturing facility. Of course, the State fails to observe that the statute
in question applies only to the State and its political subdivisions, and not to either CEO's
or University administrators. More importantly, the State does not even offer a reason
why certified mail receipts would not serve to establish delivery of a notice to a CEO or
University administrator. The State's argument provides no compelling reason to ignore
the return receipt as demonstrating delivery of the notice.
The State also suggests that because Shafer "did not use the listed address for the
executive offices of the attorney general... [s]uch misdirection does nothing to provide the
notice." (See, Appellee's Brief at pp. 1 l-12)(emphasis added). The State is attempting to
import requirements wholly unsupported by the language of the Act. Nowhere does
either the Governmental Immunity Act or the general mailing provisions specify that any
one particular office must receive the notice, let alone that the 'executive office' is the
only appropriate location for delivery of notice.
The State supports its position by citing Thimmes v. Utah State Univ., 2001 UT
App 93, 22 P.3d 257. However, the claimant there directed her claim to the Utah State
Government Risk Management Division, not to the Attorney General at a designated
office. Utah State's Risk Management Division maintains an entirely separate listing and
office from that of the Attorney General. (R. at 82, 79-80). The Thimmes claimant made
no attempt to direct or deliver a written notice to the attorney general's office and only
6

delivered notice to Utah State's Risk Management Division. Here, by contrast, no
question exists that an office of the attorney general received certified mail directed to the
Attorney General, Jan Graham.
In fact, the State admits that the office which received the notice held authority to
accept certified mail on Attorney General Jan Graham's behalf. H[N]othing indicates that
State Mail is unauthorized to accept documents... under the Attorney General's name."
(Appellee's Brief at p. 12). If the authority exists to receive certified mail, then the office
must have a procedure to deliver the document to the Attorney General. This should not
be misconstrued as an attempt to resurrect an 'actual notice' standard. Rather, this is
delivery at an office of the attorney general admittedly authorized to receive paperwork
on behalf of the Attorney General. Nothing more is required under the plain language of
the Governmental Immunity Act. Accordingly, Shafer successfully directed and
delivered a notice of claim to the Attorney General and dismissal was inappropriate.
IDL

BECAUSE THERE EXISTS AN INHERENT AMBIGUITY IN
APPLYING THE NOTICE PROVISIONS. NOTICE IS DELIVERED
WHERE THE PURPOSES OF PROVIDING A NOTICE ARE MET,

The State of Utah offers no argument against Shafer's contention that, because
there exist several offices listed by the attorney general, an inherent ambiguity exists as to
which office is qualified to receive notice of claim. The State's argument is that only the
Attorney General him/herself may receive notice and it must be sent to the 'executive
office' of the attorney general. (See, Appellee's Brief at p. 11). The State offers no
reason why other listed offices fail as an office of the Attorney General. In fact, the State
7

has already argued in another proceeding that delivery to the Attorney General's office of
litigation is also ineffective. (See, Memorandum In Supp. State's Motion to Dismiss,
Fourth Judicial District Court, Case No., attached as Addendum). Under the State's
argument that the Attorney General him/herself must receive the notice, nothing prevents
argument that even delivery to the executive office fails to satisfy the statute.
Accordingly, in the face of these ambiguities, it is appropriate to look to whether the
purpose of the notice requirement has been met. The State offering no argument to the
contrary, the purpose of a notice has been met in this case and the trial court's decision
should be reversed.
IV,

NOTICE TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR SATISFIES THE
ACT'S REQUIREMENTS,

According to the State, delivering notice of claim to executive director Craig
Lacey "would be effective only were the claim against a public board... other than the
State." (See, Appellee's Brief at p 14)(emphasis in original). However, the statute
expressly allows that notice of claim can be delivered to "the attorney general, when the
claim is against the State of Utah; or ... the executive director when the claim is against
any other public board, commission or body." See, Utah Code Ann. § 63-301 l(3)(b)(ii)(E) & (F) (West 2002)(emphasis added). The State admitted Heber Valley
Historic Railroad was maintained "as part of defendant." (See. Def. Mem. Supp. Dismiss
at para 1). Here, the claims asserted by Ms. Shafer are against Heber Valley through the
State of Utah's admitted operation of that public body. Accordingly, receipt by the
8

executive director satisfies the notice of claim provisions.
CONCLUSION
The State confuses the failure to raise an argument with the failure to cite authority
in support of the argument. Appellant Shafer properly raised the issues of whether return
receipt evidence of mailing to the attorney general at a listed office established delivery
of a notice. The State offers no compelling grounds for rejecting return receipt as
evidence of acceptance by a listed office of the attorney general. Moreover, the State
does not even argue against finding an inherent ambiguity under the plain language of the
Governmental Immunity where several offices are listed for the attorney general, but the
Act fails to specify which office is qualified to receive a notice of claim. Finally, the
claims asserted in this action are against Heber Valley Railroad, through the State's
admitted operation of that public body. Directing and delivering a notice to the executive
director of the public body complied with the Act's notice of claim requirement. Because
a notice of claim was directed and delivered, the trial court erred in granting the State's
Motion to Dismiss and should be reversed.
DATED thisrC

day of July, 2002

PETER W. SUMMERILL
Attorney for Appellant/Plaintiff

9

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
This is to certify that on

PL
day of July, 2002,1 mailed two true and correct
copies of the above and foregoing Appellants' Reply Brief, postage prepaid, to:
Nancy Kemp
Assistant Attorney General
Mark Shurtleff
Utah Attorney General
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor
Mail Stop 140856
Salt Lake City, Ut. 84114-0856
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ADDENDUM

COPY
SANDRA L. STEINVOORT (5352)
Assistant Utah Attorney General
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666)
Utah Attorney General
Attorneys for Defendant Heber Valley
Historic Railroad Authority
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor
P.O. Box 140856
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0856
Telephone: (801) 366-0100

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

DONALD T. WILLS and RITA WILLS,

:

Plaintiffs,

:

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS
PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT

:

Case No. 010500542

vs.

HEBER VALLEY HISTORIC
RAILROAD AUTHORITY,
Defendant.

Defendant, by and through Sandra L. Steinvoort, Assistant Attorney General, submits this
Memorandum in support of its Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' complaint. The Plaintiffs have
failed to comply with Utah Governmental Immunity Act, and are thus barred from pursuing suit.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
1.

The plaintiffs were injured on December 20,2000 when they collided with the

defendant's railroad engine. (Comp. ^ 4 and 6).
2.

On June 19,2001, the plaintiffs served a Notice of Claim. (See Exhibit A)
ARGUMENT
FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE UTAH
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT BARS
RECOVERY AND REQUIRES DISMISSAL
WITH PREJUDICE

I. U.C.A. SECTION 63-30-12
It is well established that the Utah Governmental Immunity Act ("the Act") mandates the
filing of a Notice of Claim as a jurisdictional precondition to suit. (U.C.A. § 63-30-12) Failure
to comply with the Notice of Claim requirement within one year of the incident giving rise to the
lawsuit bars the action because it denies the court subject matter jurisdiction. Madsen v.
Borthick. 769 P.2d 245, 250 (Utah 1998); Lamarr v. Utah State Dep't. of Transn.. 828 P.2d 535,
541 (Utah App. 1992). The Act requires that the Notice of Claim be delivered to the Attorney
General. (U.C.A. § 63-30-1 l(3)(b)(ii)(E))
It is undisputed that the plaintiffs filed a Notice of Claim as required by statute.
However, the Notice of Claim was mailed to a division within the Attorney General's office, not

2

addressed to the Attorney General, nor sent to his office.1 The plain language of the Act requires
that the Notice be "directed and delivered" to "the Attorney General" when the claim is against
the State of Utah. (U.C.A. §§ 63-30-1 l(3)(b)(ii)(E) and 63-3012) Notice to anyone else is
insufficient. Bellonio v. Salt Lake City, 911 P.2d 1294, 1297-98 (Utah App. 1996); (notice to
city employees was defective because plain language of statute designates city's "governing
body" as proper recipient.)
By identifying only "the Attorney General" as the Notice of Claim recipient, the statute
creates a bright line test for determining compliance and avoids the risks of lost or misdirected
Notices of Claim. The specific designation of the Notice recipient is intended to allow prompt
claim handling by the authorized public officials. Here, the plaintiffs' Notice of Claim was
directed to "Attorney General" and delivered to an address directed to an address at which there
are several divisions of the Attorney General's office, but not the Attorney General Mark
Shurtleff s office. The divisions, any of which could have received the Notice of Claim, lack the
authority to receive Notices of Claim on behalf of the Attorney General, and have no
responsibility or procedure to handle them.
In Thimmes v. Utah State University et a l , 22 P.3d 257, the Court of Appeals stated that
the statute removes any ambiguity as to who is to be served. An individual making a claim does

1

The Attorney General's Office is located at 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City. The
Notice of Claim was mailed to the Heber Wells Building at 160 East 300 South, Salt Lake City.
3

not need to infer who to serve because it is clear from the statute. Id at 259. In Scarborough v.
Granite School District 531 P.2d 480,482 (Utah 1975), the Supreme Court affirmed the trial
courts dismissal of the plaintiffs lawsuit because she failed to comply with the Act. The Court
stated:
We have consistently held that where a cause of action is based
upon statute, full compliance with its requirements is a condition
precedent to the right to maintain a suit. In order to so meet the
requirements of the statute... and fulfill its intended purpose... [the
Notice] be directed to and delivered to someone authorized to or
responsible for receiving it.... (citation omitted)(emphasis added)
In Bellonio v. Salt Lake Citv Corporation. 911 P.2d 1294,1295 (Utah App. 1996), the
Court of Appeals once again reiterated that the Notice of Claim must be file with the conect
person. In Shunk v. Sate of Utah et aL 924 P.2d 879 (Utah 1996), the Utah Supreme Court
stated that proper service of the Notice of Claim is a prerequisite to suit. And in the very recent
case of Greene v. Utah Transit Authority. 2001 UT 109 (December 18, 2001), the Supreme
Court emphasized "Utah law mandates strict compliance with the requirements of the Immunity
Act." (emphasis added) The Court continued, "...the statute is clear, readily available, and easily
accessible by counsel, there is no reason to require anything less than strict compliance. Actual
notice of a claim by a government entity does not excuse a claimant's strict compliance with the
requirements of the Immunity Act." (citations omitted)
It appears obvious; failure to properly comply with the Act denies the court subject matter
jurisdiction. Thus, dismissal of the complaint is warranted and appropriate.
4

n. U.C.A, SECTION 63-30-19
The plaintiffs3 also failed to file an undertaking with the complaint as required by the Act.
At the time a plaintiff files an action against a governmental entity, the plaintiff must also file an
undertaking in a sum fixed by the Court. (Utah Code Ann, § 63-30-19 (1997))
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the defendant requests that this court dismiss the plaintiffs*
complaint with prejudice.
DATED this X L day of December, 2001.
MARKL.SHURTLEFF
Utah Attorney General

SANDRA L. STEINVOORT
Assistant Utah Attorney General
Attorneys for Defendant Heber Valley Historic
Railroad Authority
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this

day of December, 2001,1 caused to be served by U.S.

Mail, postage pre-paid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM IN
SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT, to
the following:
Samuel D. McVey, Esq.
KIRTON & McCONKIE
1800 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
P.O. Box 45120
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0120

6

KlRTONS
VPCCNKE
AMUEL D. MCVEY

A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION

T E L E P H O N E (SOI j 32©-3GOO

1800 EAGLE GATE TOWER
60 EAST SOUTH TEMPLE
P.O. BOX 4 5 1 2 0
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84145-0120
www.kmclaw.com

E-MAIL: smcvey©Kmclaw,com

) ADMITTED IN CALIFORNIA

sd Appellate Law Specialist
uia State Bar Board of Specializaiion

FAX ( 8 0 1 ) 3 2 * 4 B 9 3

ATTORNEYS A T LAW

June 19,2001

VIA CERTIFIED MAIL
Utah State Risk Management Fund
Attn: Terri Marshall
5120 State Office Bldg.
Salt Lake City, UT 84114

Executive Director
Heber Valley Historic Railroad Authority
450 South 600 West
P.O. Box 609
Heber City, UT 84032

Attorney General
State of Utah
160 East 300 South, 5lh Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0873

RE:

Notice of Claim of Don and Rita Wills
Date of Loss: 12/20/00

Dear Reader:
This letter constitutes a claim under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act regarding an
accident involving our clients, Donald T. and Rita Wills and a railroad engine and generator
owned and operated by the Heber Valley Historic Railroad Authority, a Utah governmental
agency formed under Utah Code Annotated section 9-3-301 et seq. Don and Rita Wills suffered
severe injuries as a result of the accident and are seeking compensation for special and general
damages as further outlined below.
1.

Facts.

On the evening of December 20,2000, Don and Rita Wills were driving their Honda
sedan northbound on State Route 113 near Midway, Utah. It was approximately 9:20 p.m. It
was dark and the Wills were traveling within the speed limit They were wearing seatbelts.

June 19,2001
Page 2

A black Heber Valley Railroad engine with a generator on the back was stopped at the
edge of the highway. It was hardly visible. It had been traveling eastbound operated by KejuMcConnell. Although he has admitted to several witnesses including Craig Drurytwo days after
the accident that he saw the Wills' car headlights coming but started the engine anyway and
proceeded across the road at 4 m.p.h., much too slow to get across the road without causing an
accident. The engine drove across the highway grade crossing without sounding any bell, horn
or whistle. Don Wills saw the outline of the black engine too late to stop. He applied his brakes.
However, before his car could come to a stop, it collided with the side of the train at an estimated
impact speed of 20 - 30 m.p.h. The train was able to stop within about one foot.
Dr. Craig Ford was driving southbound approaching the grade crossing at the time of the
accident. He likewise heard no whistle and no horn. Similarly, there were no lights or lanterns
visible from the train. The train did have its narrow beam headlight on but it was not visible
from the side of the train. Dr. Ford indicated that he very nearly ran into the train himself and
looked at the engine afterward. All reflective devices on the side of the engine were covered
with grease and grime. In fact, in the attached photos, it is apparent that even with headlights
shining on the train, it can hardly be seen in the dark.
Another Heber Historic Railroad train had passed through the grade a few moments
before. It's crew had put out flares with a flagman during its crossing but had picked them back
up according to Dawn Grams who was on the train. In contrast, McConnell could have easily put
out flares or had his brakeman flag traffic. He also could have simply waited for the Wills' car to
pass rather than trying to start the train and outrun the Wills without sounding any signal.
We understand that Ken McConnell is a volunteer for the railroad but is paid when he
drives. We presume he was in the scope of his employment when the accident occurred. Nancy
Amos, who resides in Heber and who used to work for the railroad, indicates Mr. McConnell
runs through intersections without sounding his signals all of the time. He also crashed through
an engine house last July. There have been numerous customer complaints about his
carelessness even before the accident yet he continued to be allowed to drive, Mike Winderton
indicates McConnell was responsible for about 75% of the accidents at the railroad in 1999-2000
but never had any disciplinary action taken against him and never was restricted by management
from driving the trains. Bonnie Durtschi whose family owns the farm adjacent to the grade
crossing similarly indicates that the train never blows its horn or whistle before that grade
crossing. Utah statutes impose a duty on a railroad to ring a bell continuously or sound a whistle
or siren before reaching a grade crossing. The crossing has a railroad sign but no lights or
crossing aims even though the railroad has such devices stored at its yard but has never installed

June 19,2001
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them. We understand that smce the accident, the railroad authority has put reflective tape on the
engine.
Craig Lacey, the railroad manager, admitted to Dawn Grams that the accident could have
been prevented and it was the railroad's fault For your convenience, we have enclosed a draft
accident report which gives a general idea of die layout of the crossing. We have also enclosed
three pages of photographs showing damage to the Wills* vehicle and the lack of any side
running lights or adequate reflectors on the train.
2.

Medical Damages.

Following the accident, Mr. and Mrs. Wills were taken by ambulance to the Heber Valley
Medical Center. Mrs. Wills was life-flighted from there to LDS Hospital. Mrs. Wills suffered a
broken neck, a wrist fracture and head trauma, tworibfractures,contusions, soft tissue injuries,
and head trauma including a brief loss of consciousness. She had surgery for the wrist fracture
and had to receive traction for the broken neck which involved surgical attachment of a halo ring.
She becomes disoriented leading to a suspicion of closed head injury. She was hospitalized for
over a week.
She is now able to walk. Although her condition has not stabilized completely, her
physician states she has incurred restricted movement in her neck and on her left side. She has
difficulty in closing her left hand. She is continuing in physical therapy. She continues to have
pain in her shoulder, back and neck. Dr. MacFarlane stated on May 16, 2001 that she may not
fully recover her ability to move her head.
Don Wills suffered trauma to his chest including a pulmonary contusion and compressed
disks in his thoracic spine as noted on Dr. Hopkin's radiology report of December 29,2001. He
suffered a sternal fracture, a fibularfracturein his leg and torn ligaments in his right ankle. He
spent three days in the hospital. The doctor also described his condition as "significant chest and
extremity trauma" (Heber Valley Medical Center record Page 2 of 3). Dr. MacFarlane stated
regarding the compressed disks that if the pain is going to go away, it should do so within three
months. The pain is still there. He is looking into a procedure where synthetic material is
injected into the vertebra to reduce the discomfort.
Prior to the accident, Mr. Wills had occasional atrial fibrillation though no significant
episodes within the year before the accident. Since the accident, however, he has suffered from
frequent fibrillation and even had to be admitted into the Veteran's Hospital. We believe the
significantly increased episodes of fibrillation were due to the chest trauma suffered by him and
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the post-accident stress. Mr. Wills now has decreased range of motion due to the cervical
injuries, suffers from headaches and back pain and dramatically increased episodes of fibrillation.
He also suffers from continued leg soreness. He cannot walk over a few hundred yards.
We have attached both Rita and Don's medical records and bills to date, including preaccident records. Note that Rita's bills total $32,595.26. Don's bills total $9,036.73. There PIP
limits were $3,000 through Farmers and that amount has been exhausted.
3.

Economic Loss.

Mr. and Mrs. Wills were self-employed as property managers of their rental property.
Mr. Wills was 66 at the time of the accident and Mrs. Wills was 63. They were in excellent
health and worked as property managers on their rentals doing such things as painting, cleaning,
replacing carpet, doing yard work and related duties. They expected to be able to perform these
tasks for at least the next 10 years. Because of their injuries, they have not been able to perform
even minor tasks and have had to hire replacement labor to take car of their rental properties.
This additional cost amounts to up to $500 per month. At this point, we have no reason to
believe that the Wills will be able to return to doing the work they were doing and they will
continue to have to pay for property maintenance on their rental properties.
4.

Property Damage.

The Wills' automobile was totaled. Farmers has paid the value of the car and will
suborgate against the Wills for any recovery for property damages.
5-

Settlement,

Rita Wills has very high special damages in the form of her medical bills. Even more
significantly, she has remained in constant pain and has suffered a serious decrease in her quality
of life as a result of this accident. Don Wills was fortunately not hurt as bad as his wife but has
still had significant medical damages. He was a health}7, robust gentleman who did all of his own
property maintenance from plumbing through yard work. He now suffers pain which prohibits
him from doing the work. His quality of life has likewise seriously declined.
We believe that several major factors giveriseto liability, most particularly the facts that
Mr, McConnell saw the Wills5 vehicle coming, could have stopped within a matter of a couple of
feet yet chose to proceed across the grade crossing without sounding his horn. Further, the
railroad had a statutory duty to sound a horn, siren or bell continuously up to the crossing but
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failed to do so. The engine was by and in large incapable of being seen in the dark as it was
black with no running lights visible from the side and what limited reflectors there were could
not be seen easily due to dirt and grime. A number of other individuals have had close calls at
the intersection and have complained about McConnell and the railroad authority is aware of that
fact Based on all of these factors, we believe that we can prevail with a negligence cause of
action. If a state entity were subject to punitive damages, this would be a good case for them.
If we can avoid delay and expense of trial, we are authorized to settle this case at a
discount if adequate funds can be provided. At present, we are authorized to accept the statutory
maximum sum of $325,000.00 in full satisfaction of Rita Wills' claim (on July l*1 the statutory
maximum increases to $500,000.00). We are also authorized to accept the sum of $190,000.00
in full satisfaction of Don Wills' claim.
We would appreciate your adjusting this claim as soon as possible. Please contact us if
we can provide additional informationVery truly yours,
IORTON&McCONKIE
V
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